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On January 4, 1972, the New York Times reported radioactive
leakage from a package aboard a commercial airliner and the re-
sulting contamination of passengers, baggage, and aircraft. After
delivery of the package, the aircraft had made eight more passenger
flights before the consignee informed the airline of the leakage.1
The aircraft had been contaminated,' and 917 people had traveled
on the plane before the discovery of the leak. The Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) reported "considerable contamination" in the
baggage compartment, but said the passenger areas were "basically
clean."' By telephone contacts and press releases, passengers were
notified of opportunities to check the extent of their own exposure.
4
Over a year later, congressional hearings publicly revealed the
extent of the contamination, which was hardly "basically clean."
The affected passengers had been subjected to amounts of ionizing
radiation far in excess of that which federal guidelines permit per
year.1 Two and a half days after the containers were loaded on the
aircraft and long after they had been removed, AEC readings
showed an emission level of three rems0 per hour at the passenger
I N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1972, at 14, col. 6. Delta Airlines flight 925 on Decem-
ber 31, 1971, was carrying radioactive medical isotopes in two containers weigh-
ing 860 lbs., most of which was lead shielding.
The access route for air movement between the cargo compartment and the
aircraft ventilating system was a hole provided to allow for pressure equalization.
Contamination could result from airborne particulate matter and, of course, by
direct penetration through the cabin floor., NTSB, REPORT OF AIRCRAFT RADIO-
ACTIVE CONTAMINATION INCIDENT, DELTA AIRLINES, INC. (Dec. 31,. 1971). [here-
inafter cited as NTSB REPORT]
3 N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1972, at 14, col. 6.
4 NTSB REPORT.
1 The level is fairly arbitrarily set at 170 millirems per year to govern ex-
posure to man-made radiation. Variable amounts of natural radiation are ab-
sorbed by every human being each year which, of course, are not regulated.
1 The measurement of dose rates is calibrated in terms of the rem, or "Ro-
entgen equivalent, man." It is the absorbed dose of any ionizing radiation which
has the same biological effect as one rad of X-ray radiation. A rad is a basic
unit of absorbed dose of radiation. See ELLET, STATE CONTROL AND ADMINIS-
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seats nearest the containers.' Anyone sitting in that general area
would have received his yearly acceptable level of radiation ex-
posure in less than an hour, and that was days after the leaking
package had been removed.
RADIATION AND ITS EFFECTS
Radiation's presence is not easily perceptible to human senses.
An individual may be receiving excessive dosages of radiation and
remain completely oblivious of the fact, and yet the impact can
be devastating.! Radiation affects the atoms comprising the human
body by ionization or orbital displacement of electrons from an
atom's nucleus.' The amount of radiation received is a function
of intensity, duration, and frequency of the exposures. A reduction
of any of these functions will measurably reduce the consequences
of exposure to radiation. The quantum of radiation escaping will
also depend on the type of radiation. All radiation can prove dam-
aging to the human body if sufficient quantity, duration, and fre-
quency is involved; within certain limits, the body can repair this
damage with no noticeable effects. Hence, all exposure standards
should be geared toward keeping within those limits.
Under accepted federal guidelines,'1 exposure to man-made radio-
TRATION OF ATOMIC RADIATION 17 (1957); AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Radiation
Injuries at 735-39.
71Hearings on the Transportation of Hazardous Materials by Air before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
38 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings].
' See AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS Radiation Injuries at 720-39 for discussion
of radiation and its effects; see also ELLET, supra note 6, at 9-21; HurTON,
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF IONIZING RADIATION 3-9 (1966).
1 Nuclear radiation is basically of two types: particulate matter from the
nucleus of an atom and high energy electromagnetic radiations known as gamma
rays. Alpha particles are relatively easy to shield-a piece of paper will absorb
them and they travel only short distances. Beta particles are not much more
powerful. Gamma particles, however, present the greatest danger. They travel
great distances and, for some isotopes, five inches of lead is not effective as a
shield.
10 R. LOWENSTEIN, The Role and Establishment of Safety Standards, CON-
FERENCE ON ATOMIC RADIATION AND THE LAW, at 22 (U. of Chicago Law School,
1961).
11 The National Committee on Radiation Protection formulates the recom-
mended guidelines and publishes them through the National Bureau of Standards.
It is generally accepted that exposure to 450 rems of gamma radiation will be
fatal to 50 per cent of those so exposed. The minimum exposure which can pro-
duce noticeable effects on the body is about 25 rems. The minimum exposure
NOTES
active sources per year should not exceed 170 milli-rems. It is esti-
mated that Americans receive about 100 milli-rems per year from
natural radiation, including cosmic rays and radioactive material
in the earth. A person flying coast-to-coast would expect an addi-
tional three to five milli-rems per flight because he would be sub-
jected to more cosmic radiation than at ground level."2
The effects of radiation may be classified either as somatic, the
effect on the individual, or genetic, the effect on future generations.
Radiation criteria for individual members of society are based on
somatic effects, while criteria for the public as a whole are gov-
erned by possible genetic effects. Somatic damage can result both
from relatively low level radiation, for which there is not much
data, and from acute radiation. It is also thought that such patho-
logical effects as shortened life span and specific diseases may be
enhanced by radiation exposure." At least one report has concluded
that .17 rems per person per year for a generation would lead to
significant increases in disease, perhaps up to as much as six
thousand resultant cancer deaths per year.'
It is accepted that the federal guidelines are not based solely on
scientific or biomedical considerations but are also based partly on
value judgments with respect to an acceptable risk level. It is inevit-
able that the possible risks must be weighed against the benefits that
society obtains from radioactive substances, particularly in the ener-
gy-producing and health industries.
THE REGULATORY AGENCIES
The carriage of hazardous materials has been a fact of life in the
United States since 1946. The magnitude of the problem associated
with hazardous materials is readily apparent from the frequency of
below which no genetic damage will occur is not known. The allowable exposure
for individuals varies according to age, occupation, and the part of the body ex-
posed. Occupational workers are permitted whole body doses of five rems per
year for their entire careers; individual members of the public may be permitted
as much as .5 rems per year but the average for all members of the public must
not exceed .17 rems per year. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Study of
the Transportation of Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 309 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 Hear-
ings]; see HutrON, supra note 8, at 26-34.
12N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1972, at 1, col. 6, and at 35, col. 2.
13 R. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 10, at 22.
14 N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1972, at 1, col. 6, and at 35, col. 2.
1974]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
their movement in the channels of commerce. Several authorities
have indicated that at least one of the eight major classifications of
hazardous materials" is carried on board almost every commercial
airline flight today. It is estimated" that there are between 500,000
and 800,000 shipments of these hazardous materials each year in
all modes of transportation, including air, rail, highway, and water.
Approximately 90 per cent of these shipments are comprised of ra-
dioisotopes, three-quarters of which are shipped by air. Thus, ac-
cording to these estimates, between 300,000 and 540,000 air ship-
ments of radioactive materials are made each year, most on regular-
ly-scheduled aircraft.
The nuclear industry is undergoing rapid expansion which is ex-
pected to continue throughout the decade-understandable in light
of the present energy situation. The overall annual growth rate is
approximately fifteen per cent while the radio-pharmaceutical field is
expanding at twenty-five per cent per year.1" These radioisotopes
used for medical purposes usually have short half-lives18 and conse-
quently must be shipped by air to maximize efficient use. Other iso-
topes are used in industrial applications such as radiography, mea-
suring devices, self-illuminating devices, and istotopic power de-
vices, and are undoubtedly essential to large segments of modem
industry. Nonetheless, in order to enjoy the full benefit these ma-
terials can bring, every reasonable precaution must be utilized to in-
sure the safety of the public.
Administratively there have been myriad attempts at regulating"
the transportation of hazardous substances." The so-called hazard-
15 Hazardous materials, or "dangerous articles," are the materials defined and
regulated by the DOT, 49 C.F.R. §§ 170-89 (Supp. 1974). They include: ex-
plosives, flammable liquids and solids, oxidizing materials, corrosive liquids, com-
pressed gases, poisons, etiological agents, and radioactive materials.
16 1972 Hearings supra note 11 at 310.
1 ld.
"8 The half-life of radioactive material is the rate of decay or disintegration
undergone; it is the period of time required for a certain amount of such sub-
stance to decay to one-half of its original value. HurroN, supra note 8, at 8-9.
19The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) originally had jurisdiction
over both safety and economic aspects of radioactive carriage by land. After
DOT was created, jurisdiction over safety was transferred to DOT; ICC, for land
shipments, and the Civil Aeronautics Board, for air shipments, continue to exer-
cise control of economic aspects by means of the issuance of operating authority
and regulation of rates.
20 The problems connected with the transportation of radioactive materials
are similar to problems associated with transporting other dangerous articles.
ous materials function includes regulation, enforcement, accident
investigation, and research and development. Formerly, the Feder-
al Aviation Agency (FAA) regulated the carriage of such sub-
stances by air. 1 With the promulgation of the Department of Trans-
portation Act on October 15, 1966, most of these administrative
and regulatory functions were delegated to the Department of
Transportation (DOT)." The functions, powers, and duties relat-
ing to aviation safety were vested in the Secretary of Transporta-
tion,' with statutory delegations of authority given to the Admin-
istrator of the FAA. The various operating administrations of DOT,
including the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Highway
Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, and United
States Coast Guard, control shipments of radioactive materials in
their various modes of transportation.
The Administrator of the FAA has responsibility for establish-
ing and enforcing regulations in all facets of air transportation un-
der the 1958 Act?' The FAA, whose responsibility to enforce be-
gins when a carrier is offered something for shipment, must insure
compliance by the air carriers in transporting the goods and by the
shippers when cargo is tendered for air carriage. In 1973, the FAA
had over 800 inspectors,' none of whom dealt exclusively with ra-
dioactive materials. This staff comprised a decentralized system of
regional control centers which have been part of a hazardous mater-
There must be labels that will inform handlers of potential dangers, instructions
on how to handle them, steps to take to minimize damage and injury in event of
accident, and packaging requirements to ensure the least amount of handling by
experts. There are corresponding hazards: carrier personnel shielding is required,
certain critical masses may not be brought together, and packages must be con-
structed with the view of possible leakage following a crash. W. BERMAN & L.
HYDEMAN, FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RADIATION PROTECTION:
T E NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION (1959).
21 This was accomplished under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
51301 et seq. (1970).
2The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare controls shipments of
etiological agents, 42 U.S.C. § 241 (1970), and household hazardous substances,
15 U.S.C. 5§ 1261-73 (1970); the Department of Agriculture regulates pesti-
cides, 7 U.S.C. S 135 (1970); the Atomic Energy Commission regulates special
nuclear materials and byproducts, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970); chemical and bio-
logical warfare is administered by the Department of Defense, 50 U.S.C. §
1511-16 (1970).
'The Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1655 (1970).
24 Sec. 902(h).
22 1973 Hearings, supra 7, at 36.
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ials reporting system since 1946 and a national system since 1971 "
The Department of Transportation hierarchy is somewhat frag-
mented. 7 The Office of Hazardous Materials (OHM) is primarily
concerned with the surveillance and enforcement of the regulations
on the manufacturers and shippers who are an integral part of the
transportation chain acting as initiators. Under the original Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, the FAA had this duty, but it was delegated
to OHM in 1969.8 OHM is comprised mostly of technical staff
qualified in radiation matters who attempt to coordinate the devel-
opment of regulations.
Another DOT branch, the Hazardous Materials Regulations
Board (HMRB)," ° was established to insure the consistency of the
regulations among each of the transportation modes, and conse-
quently is composed of a representative from each mode of DOT
and from OHM. The HMRB is the only formal mechanism for deal-
ing comprehensively with any aspect of hazardous materials con-
trol. It establishes departmental policy for the promulgation of
regulation amendments.
The other major regulatory body involved is the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC). Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,"'
the AEC has responsibility for licensing and safety in the posses-
sion, use, and transport of byproduct, source, and special nuclear
materials.' The AEC has established requirements for licensees to
deliver licensed materials for transport if fissile material or large
radioactive sources are involved.
2 Id.
27 The Department of Transportation
HMRB OHM
USCGA FAA FRA FHWA
28 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 134.
29 OHM requested budget allocations for 40 employees in FY 1975, an in-
crease of three. Hearings on the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1975 before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 104-5 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974
Hearings].
20HMRB was established by order of the Secretary of Transportation. DOT
Order 1100.11 (July 27, 1967).
"
1The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
3242 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2112 (1970).
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The AEC also assists DOT in establishing national safety stand-
ards and in reviewing and evaluating packaging designs. In 1973,
the AEC and the DOT re-defined their roles in the handling of
radioactive materials. According to the understanding reached, the
DOT was to regulate handling and shipping and to set standards for
packages in small quantities shipments; the AEC would continue its
work in evaluating and approving package designs and in maintain-
ing standards for containers destined to hold fissionable materials
and larger quantities of radioactive materials.'
Finally, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) co-
exists autonomously with DOT. It was created in the DOT Act of
1966 and given responsibilities that extend to the fields of aviation,
railroad, pipeline, highway, and marine safety. Its main purpose is
to investigate and determine the probable causes of transportation
accidents.8 ' Though the NTSB is not actually a part of the regula-
tory scheme, it does perform investigatory functions which can have
a substantial effect on causes of action brought for radiation injury.'
Recently, Congress empowered the Board to evaluate the adequacy
of safeguards and procedures concerning the transportation of haz-
ardous materials, as well as the performance of the other govern-
ment agencies in dealing with their own responsibilities in this
area.'0
THE REGULATIONS
Of all the hazardous materials regulations, those governing radio-
active materials are perhaps most misunderstood by those who most
need to understand them, that is, the personnel involved in manu-
facturing the containers, shipping the materials, and storing or load-
33 N.Y. Times, March 25, 1973, at 67, col. 8.
', Though the NTSB's accident investigations are theoretically non-adversary
inquisitions in an attempt to uncover the facts, the investigations sometimes de-
volve into adversary events as the various vested interests compete-e.g., the
airline's vested interest to learn the facts first and then withhold the information
in self-defense. NTSB has full authority to investigate accidents under Title VII
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. Lederer, Ideal Safety System for Accident
Prevention, 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 336 (1968).
"Although the NTSB as originally created was under the aegis of the DOT,
Congress reiterated the Board's independent stature in the Transportation Safety
Act of 1974 § 302 (P.L. 93-633; 88 Stat. 2156) after finding that it could not
properly perform its functions unless totally separate and independent of any
other federal department.
'Transportation Safety Act of 1974 5 304(a)(8).
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ing the materials in the proper place. The regulations pertinent to
the transport of such substances by air are found in the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FAR), Title 14 of the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations, Part 103, and are essentially supplementary; that is, most
of the regulations are in fact accomplished by reference to appro-
priate sections of 49 C.F.R. Parts 170-189 (1973) dealing with
rail and highway transportation. The standards for the packaging of
large sources and fissile materials 7 are contained in the AEC regu-
lations, 10 C.F.R. Part 71 (1972), and pertinent postal regulations
are in 39 C.F.R. Parts 124-125 (1970). The regulations cover the
various areas that need control: classification, marking, labelling,
placarding, packaging, shipping papers, compatibility, stowage,
transit routing and handling, enforcement, surveillance, accident
investigation, research, data collection and compilation, and inter-
national and interagency coordination.
Part 103 of the Federal Aviation Regulations prescribes rules
for the loading and carrying of dangerous articles in civil aircraft. 8
There are, however, exceptions. The regulations do not apply to ra-
dioactive materials shipped in cargo-only aircraft which are super-
vised by the Atomic Energy Commission or the Department of De-
fense." Similar shipments made for national security reasons are
also excused.4" Any radioactive materials that would be exempted
from packing, marking, or labelling requirements for shipment by
rail express ' are also beyond the scope of FAR 103. In addition,
the regulations are calculated to allow carriage of innocuous ship-
ments of hazardous materials, which the Department of Transpor-
tation has determined to present a low risk to the public,' with vir-
tually no regulation at all.'
Although the FAA places primary responsibility on the air car-
3749 C.F.R. 5 173.389(a) (1972); 49 C.F.R. § 173.396 (1972).
38 14 C.F.R. 5 103.1(a) (1972).
3914 C.F.R. 5 103.1(b)(3) (1972).
40 Id.
41 See 49 C.F.R. § 172, 173 (1973).
42 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 36.
4E.g., 14 C.F.R. § 103.1(c)(4) (1972) is intended to exclude from regula-
tion "small quantities of radiopharmaceuticals with a low level of radioactivity
extending over relatively short periods." 35 Fed. Reg. 5320. These would typically
be used by medical researchers and physicians. 14 C.F.R. § 103.1(c)(5) (1972)
excludes certain small quantities of "dangerous articles" carried in crewmembers'
bags (e.g., aerosol cans).
rier by requiring that it exercise the highest degree of care," most
violations are caused, in the first instance, by the shippers. ' Much
of the actual burden may be removed from carrier personnel by
FAR 103.3 which requires the shipper to provide a statement ac-
companying the shipment certifying compliance with the FAR 103
requirements. Shippers may not offer, and carriers may not know-
ingly accept, any dangerous article for shipment without the ship-
per's certificate. ' -Since there is little positive assurance that the
package is in complete compliance, the regulations allow the air-
craft operator to rely on the certificate as prima facie evidence of
compliance. "7 In effect, the use of the required certificate shifts the
burden of compliance to the shipper in all situations except those
in which the carrier knows of non-compliance.
Items otherwise prohibited from air carriage may nonetheless be
shipped when other forms of transportation are impracticable; in
an emergency the FAA may authorize deviations ' subject to vari-
ous safety precautions, particularly for dangerous articles capable
of lethal effects over an appreciable area.' Any shipment which
exceeds hazard classifications or maximum quantities" requires
either a waiver or an exemption from FAR 103 requirements. Ex-
emptions and waivers are generally issued solely for cargo-only air-
craft when to do so is considered to be in the public interest;- 1
issuances are made for passenger-carrying aircraft on rare occasions
deemed "humanitarian"' which would include emergency medical
situations. Whereas waivers are given on a one-time basis, exemp-
tions" are broader and typically last for a renewable two-year per-
iod. A major exception to the power of a shipper or carrier to
deviate from the FAR 103 requirements involves the shipment of
44 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 48.
41Id. at 120.
46 14 C.F.R. 5 103.3(a) (1968).
47 Id.
-14 C.F.R. § 103.5(a) (1972).
49 14 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(6) (1972).
"See, 49 C.F.R. S 172.5 (1973).
" 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 97.
52Hearings on Appropriations before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 150 (1973).
11Exemptions are controlled by 14 C.F.R. § 11.25 (1972), and may encom-
pass specific sections of the regulations or a particular series of trips or periods
of time.
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radioactives in civil aircraft leaving the country, for shippers or
carriers involved in exporting radioactives are precluded from ap-
plying for waivers!' and must instead seek full-fledged exemptions
which necessitate authorization by any affected nation.'
Also, the DOT may issue "special permits" which constitute
special waivers of the FAR 103 requirements. These special permits
are justified to allow for exceptions to authorized packaging designs
and the like when technology outpaces the regulations. The DOT
claims it garners a valuable fund of transportation experience on
novel forms of packaging, shipping conditions. and carrier opera-
tions."
The regulations provide different standards for passenger-carrying
aircraft' and cargo-only aircraft. Radioactive materials may be
carried in passenger aircraft, subject to the quantity limitations of
FAR 103.19(b), if they are packaged, marked, and labelled in
accordance with requirements for shipping dangerous articles by
rail express." Standards are less stringent for cargo-only aircraft."
Radioactive materials packages must comply with the standard
requirements for all hazardous materials containers"0 to be shipped
by rail express." These packaging regulations are detailed and com-
prehensive, with consideration given to the type of hazardous ma-
terial involved, its quantity, its potency, and the integrity of the
container in various hypothetical emergency situations."
-14 C.F.R. 5 103.5 (1972).
"FAA Air Carrier Operator's Bulletin 69-12.
56 Hearings on Transportation of Hazardous Materials before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 59 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings]. The Transportation Safety Act of 1974
107(a) provides the Secretary of DOT may grant an exemption if the end result
is the achievement of a level of safety greater than or equal to that level required
by the Act, or a level consistent with the public interest. Exemptions will last
two years and are renewable, but to get a renewal the operator must provide a
safety analysis justifying the exemption.
57 "Passenger-carrying" is defined as "any person other than a crew-member,
company employee, authorized representative of the United States, or a person
accompanying the shipment." 14 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) (1968).
5849 C.F.R. § 171-73 (1972); 14 C.F.R. § 103.7(b)(6) (1971).
'See 14 C.F.R. § 103.9 (1961); Cargo-only planes may carry all that a pas-
senger plane is allowed to carry as well as anything meeting requirements of
49 C.F.R. §§ 172.5, 173 (1973).
6049 C.F.R. 55 172, 173, 178 (1973).
61 14 C.F.R. 5103.11 (1967).
6 2For the packaging requirements, see 49 C.F.R. § 173.389 (1972); 49 C.F.R.
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The DOT labelling system, corresponding substantially to inter-
national standards," requires labels for air commerce even though
an article is exempt from rail express labelling requirements because
of quantity and packing limitations." Each package of radioactive
materials must be labelled on at least two opposite sides with the
standard radiation symbol."
The quantity limitations imposed by the regulations are found in
FAR 103.19. The amount of radiation emitted from a sealed pack-
age is expressed in terms of its Transport Index (TI). The TI unit
is the highest dose of radiation expressed in milli-rems per hour that
one could receive three feet from the surface of any package. The
maximum TI permitted for one package is ten (ten milli-rems per
hour), and packages of radioactive materials bearing a cumulative
total TI of more than fifty may not be placed on board an aircraft."
Shippers are charged with the responsibility of checking the dose
rate of a particular radioactive material to determine the proper
labelling in terms of TI. The shippers must also conduct a wipe test
on the outside of the package for loose radioactive contamination. 7
The regulations also require special approval before any package
which contains a large radioactive sources may be loaded on an
aircraft. Other special limitations pertain to packages bearing the
coded Yellow II or Yellow III labels denoting highly toxic sub-
stances. There are special storage control regulations based on the
5 173.393 (1972); 49 C.F.R. 5 173.394 (1972); 49 C.F.R. S 173.395 (1972);
49 C.F.R. § 173.396 (1972); 14 C.F.R. § 103.15 (1963).
63In spite of the fact the labelling system is based on the international stan-
dards and labels, at the time the DOT adopted the international system, some
critics felt American standards should have been stricter. 33 Fed. Reg. 14918
(1968).
- 14 C.F.R. 5 103.13 (1967).
- 49 C.F.R. S 173.399 (1968): on accessible surface 3 ft. distance
Radioactive White I label .5 mrem/hr 0.0
Radioactive Yellow II label _ 10. 0.5
Radioactive Yellow III label 200 10.
-14 C.F.R. S 103.19(d) (1973); The TI limit was increased in 1968 from
40 to 50. 33 Fed. Reg. 14918 (1968); Several carriers objected at the time,
but the DOT claimed the hazard potential was not increased, only the amount
of radioactive material that could be carried per flight. More stringent segrega-
tion of such materials from passengers and undeveloped films was also added to
compensate. 33 Fed. Reg. 14918 (1968).
6749 C.F.R. § 173.393(h) (1972).
6849 C.F.R. § 173.389(b); 14 C.F.R. § 103.19(d) (1973).
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total TI"' and on minimum separation distances from unexposed
film, passengers, or the nearest cargo bin partition."' In order for
the carrier properly to comply, consideration must be given to the
physical arrangement of the particular warehouse or baggage com-
partment.7'
The operator of the aircraft must always notify the pilot in com-
mand of the presence and location of any radioactive materials on
the plane."' No person may carry radioactive materials into the
cabin of a passenger plane,7 and if carried in the cargo hold the
materials must be inaccessible to everyone but crewmembers." In
a cargo-only aircraft, hazardous materials packages must likewise
be accessible to the crew; in the event of rupture, fire, or spills, in-
accessibility would prove disadvantageous to all.T
The carrier has responsibility for reporting any incident" that
occurs with respect to radioactive materials during the course of
transportation including loading, unloading, or temporary storage.77
In addition a carrier must notify the shipper as soon as possible
after the detection of any breakage, spillage, or radioactive con-
tamination. Aircraft in which such an incident has occurred may
not be put in routine use again until the radiation dose rate at any
69 14 C.F.R. 5 103.23(a) (1971); Fissile class III materials are also subject
to special limitations. These materials may be transported by air only if special
arrangements are made between consignor and carrier for a specific shipment on
a cargo-only aircraft for sole use by the consignor, or by special arrangement
between shipper and carrier for a shipment on any aircraft on which there are
no other packages of radioactive materials required to bear a label. 14 C.F.R. 5
103.24 (1973).
70 Id.; in addition, the FAA amended the regulations in 1973 to insure against
radioactive packages shifting in flight which would permit them to move closer
than allowable under 14 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (1973). See 14 C.F.R. § 103.31(e)
(1973).
7' The regulations allow 50 TI's in one bin as long as they are positioned at
least seven feet from the nearest partition. The only type of aircraft this is possi-
ble in is a DC-10's aft-belly compartment. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 64.
7' 14 C.F.R. § 103.25 (1973).
7314 C.F.R. § 103.31(a) (1974).
74 14 C.F.R. § 103.31(f) (1973).
75 14 C.F.R. § 103.31(b) (1965); 30 Fed. Reg. 13381 (1965).
76 "Incidents" include the death of any person, injuries requiring hospitaliza-
tion, carrier or other property damage exceeding $50,000, fire, breakage, spillage,
or suspected contamination resulting from a radioactive cargo, or any other situ-
ation in which a continuing danger exists or the carrier believes should be re-
ported to DOT. 14 C.F.R. § 103.28(a) (1974).
11 14 C.F.R. § 103.28(a) (1974).
accessible surface is once again within acceptable federal guideline
limits. As with other hazardous materials spills, the air carrier has
the primary responsibility for clean-up operations, though. the AEC
often is called in to advise carrier personnel."8
REGULATORY INADEQUACIES
The consensus is that the current regulations are, with minor
exceptions, adequate if followed. Officials are quick to point out
that the last twenty-five years of aviation have resulted in only three
incidents involving radioactive materials, 9 and no known injuries
or significant radiation over-exposures to transportation workers or
the general public have occurred. This record does not, of course,
reflect any possible long-term effects such as shortened life-spans
or increased incidences of cancer. In any event this testimony is
deceiving. There have been no officially reported suits arising out
of radiation over-exposures on aircraft, due, no doubt, to the phy-
sical difficulties of detecting radiation poisoning and the carrier's
desire to avoid adverse public reaction by settling the case out of
court.
The DOT's hazardous materials program is characterized by lack
of sufficient data on movements of hazardous materials, an inade-
quate inspection effort, and sporadic and ineffective enforcement
actions."8 The findings of reports by the NTSB, and allegations by
the Air Line Pilots Association, are corroborative8 and cite as
specific shortcomings in the regulatory scheme the absence of uni-
formity among DOT's modal regulations, 2 variance in permissible
levels of risk allowed by the regulations with respect to different
commodities and modes of transportation,' and the inadequacy of
78.14 C.F.R. § 103.23(b) (1973).
? 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 11.
80 1974 Hearings, supra note 29, at 119.
"' See, e.g., NTSB SPECIAL STUDY,- Risk Concepts in Dangerous Goods Trans-
portation Regulations, Report No. STS-71-1, at 4.
82 The recently enacted Transportation Safety Act of 1974 authorizes the
Secretary of Transportation to formulate regulations applicable to manufacturers,
container manufacturers, shippers, and carriers. This should rectify the fragmen-
tation of regulatory bodies and the lack of uniformity of regulations among the
various transportation modes. The present system will remain effective until abro-
gated by the newly authorized regulations which will be many months in the
making. Transportation Safety Act of 1974 § 105(a).
" Most shippers depend heavily on the tariffs (such as T.C. Georges Tariff
1974] NOTES
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
concepts of risk. Federal Aviation Administrator Alexander But-
terfield admitted that there was a long period during which the
regulatory agencies were lackadaisical, and ascribed this attitude
to lack of proof of any personal injuries or fatalities resulting from
radioactive materials being transported in airplanes." It has also
been conceded by agency officials that only a small portion of
reportable incidents are, in fact, being reported.' It has been esti-
mated that of the approximately 14,000 daily flights in the United
States as many as 11,000 may harbor FAR 103 violations."
Violations of the regulations are pervasive among shippers, pack-
ers, manufacturers, and carriers. 7 A carrier's flight and ground
operations personnel have been found to be totally unaware of
FAR 103.25 which requires that the pilot in command be informed
of any radioactive materials on board."8 Pilot and carrier representa-
tives have asserted that shippers routinely mislabel radioactive ma-
terials.8'
The NTSB reported in its findings on the Pan American incident
in the fall of 1973 that the combination of a coincidental series of
human errors as elementary as failure to tighten bottle tops and a
disregard for the applicable regulations brought about the con-
tamination.0 Such errors and "ignorance" could be significantly
No. 23) which pertain to rail and highway shipments and know little or nothing
about 14 C.F.R. S 103. Statement by Capt. H. R. Trimble (ALPA), Dec. 1, 1971.
84 Hearings on Appropriations for the Department of Transportation before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., at 149
(1973).
'5 Secretary of Transportation's Annual Report as cited in 1973 Hearings,
supra note 7, at 67.
86 Id. at 62.
"
7 Letter from NTSB to Alexander Butterfield, FAA Administrator, March 22,
1974.
"FAA Air Carrier Operations Bulletin 69-12.
88 N.Y. Times, April 26, 1974, at 8, col. 5. The Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA) testified that, when making a telephone inquiry as to why a package
labelled as a restricted article but not listed in the tariff (and therefore not to be
carried) was offered for shipment, the manufacturer's supervisor indicated that
"the tariff book couldn't possibly list every chemical because it would make the
book too big." 1971 Hearings, supra note 56, at 207-08.
" NTSB report concluded: (1) re-usable packaging did not fulfill container
requirements of the regulations; (2) the manufacturer did not have a maintenance
procedure for checking the condition of returned containers before re-use; (3)
human errors combined to cause the incident (plastic bottle top too loose and the
package rolled on its side during transport); (4) the carrier's training program
for handling radioactive materials had not reached all cargo-handling personnel;
(5) routine delay in pickup of shipment by consignee prevented timely discovery.
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diminished with strict compliance on the part of all concerned. Un-
fortunately, the lack of tangible signs or effects of radioactive leak-
age compounds current complacency.
Assuming that compliance with the regulations would provide
adequate safety and accepting the fact that many thousands of
violations occur every day, proposals to rectify the present in-
adequacies should be directed at the regulatory agencies. Regula-
tion, beyond the promulgation phase, involves two elements: in-
spection and enforcement; these are the areas to which the pro-
posals must be directed.
Although shipper and carrier noncompliance with the regulations
is commonplace at the majority of facilities inspected,"1 the number
of inspections per flight is miniscule. The policy of the agencies'
inaction is buoyed by the prevalent attitude that the materials pre-
sent no immediate threat to the safety of the air passenger. ' When
congressional interest in the transportation of hazardous materials
first arose in 1969, the DOT had no systematic method for ensuring
compliance with the regulations and instead relied on spot checks.93
At present, the two field inspectors of the Office of Hazardous Ma-
terials checks shippers and manufacturers of containers used to
transport radioactive materials. The level of noncompliance arising
from this extremely insignificant inspection effort either at the fac-
tory site or at the carrier's terminal has been as high as 90 per cent
of all packages examined." The FAA conducts virtually no field
inspection of radioactive materials packages. Though the FAA has
over 800 inspectors, each is responsible for a lengthy list of other
duties besides radioactivity inspection, and most of the inspectors
lack the technical hazardous material training that the OHM staff
91 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 2. Most non-compliance situations cited by
William Burns, director of OHM, involved labelling, documentation, false or mis-
leading certification, and failure to meet packaging requirements. It is clear that,
in radioactive materials transport, the "weakest link in the chain" principle ap-
plies to measure the effectiveness of the safeguards established by DOT.
92 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 2-3.
" Hearings on Transportation of Hazardous Materials before a Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 36 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as 1969 Hearings].
911973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 2, 6, 7. In 1973 inspections the following
is a sample of results found at selected U.S. airports: Kennedy-20 violations out
of 24 packages inspected; Philadelphia-l1/12; O'Hare--10/14; LaGuardia-
7/8; Batimore-5/6; Newark-6/6. Id. at 80.
1974]
JOURNAL OF AIR LA W AND COMMERCE
claims.' FAA inspections were significantly increased in 1973 up
to about 9000; though this total is not even the equivalent of one
day's flights, 229 violations were reported."6 The obvious infer-
ence from such figures is that a staggering number of violations
go undetected, all potentially harmful to the passenger and the
cargo handlers. The FAA acknowledges it is unfortunate that an
inspector cannot be put in every key point in the course of trans-
portation of radioactive materials.' Public policy would seem to
dictate that a manpower shortage is a weak excuse.
Unfortunately, the second of the inseparably linked elements of
radioactive materials regulation, enforcement, is likewise main-
tained at a less than efficacious level. Here again, there is limited
manpower possessing the requisite -technical skills. Problems are
inherent in the nature of what little enforcement activity is con-
ducted by the regulatory authorities. Nearly all enforcement is
"after the fact"-initiated as a follow-up to an incident or accident
rather than as a result of an on-going inspection or monitoring
program. Whether addressing enforcement of the regulations or
violations of the regulations, experts have suggested that the entire
question of shipping radioactive materials is presently based on
some kind of an "honor system."".
Lack of enforcement can lead to the disregard of any honor sys-
tem. For example, as a result of FAA-granted exemptions and
waivers given to air taxi operators, thousands of shipments are made
without strict regard to the hazardous materials regulations. Exemp-
tion holders are not required to report the volume of materials car-
ried. There is no restriction on carriage proportionate to violations
perpetrated by the particular carrier. Exemptions have even been
granted when little or no information was supplied by the carrier,
and have been renewed even though a carrier had violations out-
standing against it."
95 Hearings on Appropriations for the Department of Transportation before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at
150 (1973).
961974 Hearings, supra note 29, at 612.
Hearings on Appropriations for the Department of Transportation before a
Subcomm.,of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93d CONG., 1st Sess., at 149
(1973).
" 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 14
"Id. at 114-16.
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Too often the profit incentive nullifies the self-imposition of an
honor system, a situation which makes strong outside enforcement
even more urgent. The OHM claims lack of enforcement authority;
the OHM can simply notify the FAA of violations and request a
report from the shipper involved concerning the corrective action
taken. No criminal or civil forfeiture authority lies with the OHM
though that office has considered proposing some kind of uniform
forfeiture authority for enforcement purposes for several years."
The OHM's referral service to the FAA is not very active either;
over a two year period during which the OHM reported approxi-
mately 500 violations, only fourteen were reported with requests
for action."' The FAA is equally deficient in enforcement activities.
No criminal cases were brought by the FAA during the same two
year period and no fines were levied. There were civil forfeitures
after referral to the FAA; three fines were levied for radioactive ma-
terial regulations violations, and the remaining cases were handled
administratively.' °4 Even these actions were not taken until months
after the primary danger to passengers and plane had dissipated,
and the outrage, like the radiation, had dissipated as well.
PROPOSALS
In any regulatory system designed to prevent aircraft incidents
and accidents there are several vested interests which must be recon-
ciled, including the individual, his property, corporate pride, and
national prestige."1 Accepting the mandate of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 which sets as a goal "the highest degree of safety in
the public interest,"1 one must inevitably sacrifice and compromise
the various interests until the optimum position is reached. The
most extreme and undoubtedly most efficient solution is to refuse
to allow the carriage of radioactive materials by air under any
circumstances. The Air Line Pilots Association, among others, has
urged this position in the past,0 but the NTSB has determined that
100 Id. at 19-20.
101 Id. at 22-25.
102 Id. at 25, 61; In 1972, seventy-three enforcement actions were prosecuted
by the FAA for all hazardous materials violations. Id. at 48.
0I Lederer, The Ideal Safety System for Accident Prevention, 34 J. AIR L.
& COM. 336 (1968).
'°4Federal Aviation Act of 1958 § 601(b), 49 U.S.C. S 1301;et seq. (1970).
105 Letter from NTSB to Alexander Butterfield, FAA Administrator, March
22, 1974, cited in 1974 Hearings, supra note 29, at 613.
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conscientious compliance would avoid such a drastic step and
recommends instead a simple compliance checklist to facilitate that
objective." Others have advocated banning these items from pas-
senger-carrying aircraft.1" With its very recent passage of the Trans-
portation Safety Act of 1974,' the Congress has followed these
admonitions and provided for the curtailment of radioactive ma-
terials carriage on passenger aircraft beginning in July of 1975.'"
However, radioistopes used for medical purposes may still be car-
ried on passenger planes providing they do not pose an unreason-
able hazard to health and safety."' It must be remembered that even
before the passage of this Act ninety per cent of all radioactive ma-
terials carried by air were the same radioistopes exempted from the
proscriptions of the present Transportation Safety Act of 1974.
It is acknowledged that the public is potentially endangered by
the violation of the regulations. Despite the enormous potential
harm, it is argued that it is in the national interest to transport radio-
active materials by air, particularly in the medical radioisotope
area. This public interest theory is buttressed by the widespread
need for radioisotopes in the medical industry, many of which have
very short half-lives necessitating rapid transportation methods. To
carry radioisotopes solely on cargo-only aircraft would drastically
reduce the potential exposure to the general public, but unfortun-
ately, most United States cities do not have exclusive airfreight
service."' If radioisotopes are to be useful in protecting the health
of the public, it is necessary to further compromise and allow their
carriage by passenger aircraft.
If one concedes that radioactive materials must be transported
by air, regulation is the remaining tool. The standards on which the
regulations are based can always be made stricter, but their efficacy
remains embedded in enforcement. If the shipment is properly
packaged, and if the shipper and carrier comply with the regula-
tions, there will be little threat to the passengers.11 Enforcement is
106 Id.
107 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 54.
100 Transportation Safety Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-633; 88 Stat. 2156).
10Jd. at § 108(a).
110 Id.
I" In fact, fewer than 50 U.S. cities are so equipped. 1972 Hearings, supra
note 11, at 545.
112 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 11.
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the crux of the matter; unfortunately, an honor system approach
will not work satisfactorily. The intermediate step of augmenting
and reinforcing the standards of the regulations is certainly worth-
while if only to increase the protection the regulations will provide
when they are conscientiously enforced. Nevertheless, the primary
problem in this area has been the fragmented nature of the regula-
tory bodies, a problem that is compounded by regulations which
are essentially supplementary. The problem is particularly acute
when the commodity is entering intermodal transport. The Trans-
portation Safety Act of 1974 authorizes the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Transportation to formulate new regulations which will
consolidate the hazardous materials regulations and provide for one
controlling authority, the DOT.1 ' When this objective is effectuated,
the current problem of finding the correct regulation should con-
siderably diminished.
Other areas of concentration by the DOT should include regula-
tions designed to preclude the private rule-making apart from pub-
lic scrutiny that exists in the waiver, exemption, and special permit
devices. Under the Transportation Safety Act of 1974, the Secretary
of DOT is authorized to grant exemptions only if the level of safety
achieved is equal to or greater than that required by the regula-
tions.1 '
One method of curtailing the shipment of radioactive materials
would be the imposition of a surcharge on each shipment.'1' These
economic controls are unwise if for no other reason than they
might encourage incognito shipments and thereby provide even
greater potential for noncompliance with the regulations.
The shortcoming of any proposal to strengthen the standards
on which the regulations are based is inherent in the system into
which a new proposal must fit. Without adequate enforcement none
of these proposals can ever be efficacious. There are two methods
by which to stimulate the enforcement of the regulations. The first
is the inclusion of a genuine "consumer" representative on the
relevant regulatory bodies. The impetus behind providing regulation
for the transportation of radioactives is, in the first instance, due to
an overriding consideration for protection of the general public,
1
13 Transportation Safety Act of 1974 5 105(a) (P.L. 93-633: 88 Stat. 2156).
14Id. at S 107(a).
"' 1973 Hearings, supra note 7, at 66.
1974]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
particularly the captive innocent bystander called a passenger. No-
where else than in air transportation is a passenger less able to
exercise personal precautions to protect himself from the dangers
associated with travel in concert with the carriage of hazardous
materials.
It is safe to say that there has been an inadequate appraisal of
and consideration for the interests of the passenger.
Who is to represent these interests? Unquestionably, all parties to
past and present proceedings to change the dangerous goods regu-
lations consider the public interest, but upon whom does the burden
for representing these interests fall? Under the present regulatory
scheme this responsibility must be borne by the regulators, because
the other parties must, by their nature, give priority to represent-
ing their own interests."'
The primary beneficiary of the safety regulations has no adversary
representative on the decision-making agencies. Without incessant
motivation, bureaucracy grinds to a comfortable standstill; who
could better motivate than the intended beneficiary of the safety
restrictions?...
Monitoring, the second, method by which to enhance enforce-
ment, is derived from the fact that radioactive 'contamination may
not be readily apparent; a need exists to assure the timely discovery
of any contamination in order to protect the public, traveling or
otherwise, from exposure to the hazards. The need for timely dis-
covery was made very apparent by the Delta incident involving
some 917 passengers over the course of a two-day period."8 The
radiation exposure rate was so great that passengers could have
been exposed to their yearly acceptable dose in one sitting.
Radiation is impossible to detect without the proper instruments,
and with so little present surveillance there is a general lack of
knowledge of the full extent of the radioactive materials hazard.
Neither the number of shipments or violations is known, nor is the
significance or magnitude of the dangers that exist. It is reasonable
to believe that many more incidents occur than the few that have
"11972 Hearings, supra note 11, at 444.
117 There are admittedly problems involved in the selection of a representa-
tive, the biggest being credibility. It is submitted that neither the President of
the United States nor any of the vested interests involved in air commerce should
be consulted.
11 See note 1 supra.
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been reported, based on the number of carriages, the lack of
inspection, and the inherent public relations pressures that would
be exerted by any carrier to keep radiation leakage incidents out of
the public eye. The propensity of the shippers and carriers not to
comply with the regulations"' necessitates more than a mere re-
education of the principal parties. What is most needed is a me-
chanical surveillance system to monitor the shippers' compliance
and to allow the carrier to effectuate a competent screening system.
Under the assumption the standards set by the regulations are
adequate if followed, it is clear the methods used to insure com-
pliance have not been at all adequate. Enforcement is the key to
compliance and inspection is the key to enforcement. Most air car-
riers have neither the equipment nor the staff to properly inspect
even an insignificant portion of radioactive materials shipments.
The DOT has in the past argued against the feasibility of a full
inspection program on the basis of manpower and other economic
restrictions." The most efficient method to accomplish inspection
and enforcement is through on-the-spot monitoring by radiation
sensitive equipment.' Since a shipment is most likely to be dam-
aged or spilled during its movement, shipments should be monitored
for leakage on loading and unloading at the various carriers' re-
ceiving terminals, and prior to and immediately after loading or
unloading from the plane at its destination. Prior to take-off, the
floor of the passenger cabin should be scanned to recheck for harm-
ful radiation emissions. This is precisely the type of monitoring
needed to provide for the safety of passengers and carrier ground
personnel.'"
19 Pilot spokesmen claim the vast majority of shippers and freight forwarders
are not aware of or simply do not comply with the regulations, and seem to
encourage airline disregard of the regulations by applying economic pressures.
The airlines are accused of adopting an "everything goes" policy primarily due
to lack of qualified radioactive materials personnel. 1973 Hearings, supra note 7,
at 73.
1201969 Hearings, supra note 93, at 36.,
The AEC is considering augmenting safety devices by amending 10 C.F.R.
34 to provide for the use of thermoluminescent dosimeters or film badges by
their radiographers. Not only are dosimeters sometimes more accurate than the
conventional film badge but the direct-reading pocket dosimeters allow a person
to easily determine the extent of his own exposure. 39 Fed. Reg. 36601 (1974).
"z Under the Transportation Safety Act of 1974, a program of monitoring
radioactive materials packages will go into effect on July 1, 1975. Although the
regulation as originally proposed would have required scanning. the passenger
cabin prior to take-off, and scanning the individual packages at acceptance, trans-
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In order to make the new system completely effective, primary
liability should be shifted to the shippers. Shippers derive the most
economic benefit from air carriage of radioactive materials and
are the source of most of the regulations violations. Consequently,
they seem to be the logical focal point of any regulatory scheme as
initiators of the entire process. The foundation of the FAR 103
safety system lies in the labeling and packaging requirements, and
this area is the one in which the enforcement should be strictest.
If the labels are improper, the Transport Index tables cannot be
utilized effectively,1" and if the containers are faulty, contamina-
tion potentiality is greatly enhanced. Strong civil and criminal
sanctions should be imposed making both carriers and shippers
absolutely liable for violations of the regulations. The monitoring
function conducted by the carrier should be merely a secondary
check, though a vital one.
The radioactive materials regulations are aimed at reducing the
hazard to the public "within the limits of economic feasibility.""1 '
A foolproof monitoring system seems not only economically real-
istic but it accomplishes better than any other method the goal of
full compliance with the regulations. The one-time initial cost of
establishing this system would be high, though probably not by
government standards. The long-term cost would be minimal. Regu-
latory manpower problems would be negligible as the carrier per-
sonnel would operate the monitoring devices on an everyday basis.
There would be a need for additional agency personnel to super-
vise and re-check compliance on an irregular basis, but the imposi-
tion of sufficiently high penalties as a deterrent would not neces-
sitate agency personnel at every airport.
The public's awareness of the magnitude of radioactive materials
transport is increasing. Indignation and resentment will be wide-
spread if the "consumer" feels his welfare has been derogated in
favor of the vested interests-shippers and carriers. The federal
government has the opportunity and the responsibility to protect
fer points and destinations, complaints by the carriers and others led to the
dilution of the proposed amendment to the regulations. Beginning July 1st, the
packages will be scanned only when loaded, and the cabin will not be scanned
at all. Transportation Safety Act of 1974 § 108(a) (P.L. 93-633: 88 Stat. 2156);
40 Fed. Reg. 5140 (1975).
1'3 See note 66 supra.
1 433 Fed. Reg. 11862 (1968).
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the innocent bystander/passenger. The government, in having regu-
lations at all, acknowledges its assumption of a duty to safeguard
against over-exposure to radiation in air commerce. Experience
has shown that regulation without enforcement, or regulation by
the "honor system," does not work. Radiation monitoring is the
most efficient and economical method to insure that the human
being is adequately protected.
In summary, there should be centralization of regulatory and
enforcement functions instead of the present fragmented approach.
The regulations should allow only radioisotopes needed for medi-
cal purposes to be transported on passenger-carrying planes. As an
immediate measure, monitoring should be carried out at each junc-
ture in the regulatory transportation process, and this system should
be enforced by increasing inspection, strict liability for violations
and stiffer penalties. In the long-term, the Department of Trans-
portation and Congress should effectuate a plan for the selection
of a consumer representative for the decision-making regulatory
bodies with respect to the regulations. Also, the DOT should begin
compiling records of shipments and violations, to be used for pur-
poses of levying penalties, considering applications for waivers,
exemptions, and special permits, and facilitating public awareness.
Public awareness and the corresponding possibility of public cen-
sure for violations will undoubtedly provide the greatest impetus
for compliance by the air carrier. It is perhaps the lack of public
awareness that has enabled the present state of radioactive ma-
terials transportation to exist.
Douglas Keith Eyberg
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